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NOTES
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND LABOR DISPUTES
Introduction
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution ' has
been construed to mean that where Congress enacts legislation within
its jurisdiction and manifests its intention to pre-empt the field, all
state action must yield if it parallels,2 supplements 3 or conflicts with 4
the higher federal law. As early as 1820 the Supreme Court,5 in
answering the question whether a state government could parallel
federal action, decided that when Congress has created comprehen-
sive federal regulation with rights and remedies, it has expressed itsjudgment as to the extent to which regulation is desired, and a dupli-
cative state law is as conflicting and void as would be one in deroga-
tion of the federal law.
The real problem arises where Congress has not expressly stated
that its legislation is to pre-empt the field. This lapse on the part of
Congress creates a void that the courts have attempted to fill. As
Justice Frankfurter remarked, there is no clear path between federal
and state jurisdiction that is "susceptible of delimitation by fixed
metes and bounds." 6
In the field of labor relations, the comprehensive nature of the
Taft-Hartley Act 7 gives rise to more possibility of conflict than did
the Wagner Act.8  The boundary lines have been dislocated, leaving
'U.S. CONST. art. VI: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the UnitedStates which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supremeLaw of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby....
2 See, e.g., La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 18(1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Lab. Rel. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
3 See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Capital Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
4 See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950);Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
5 Houston v. Moore, 4 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1, 21-23 (1820).6Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
7 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1952).
8 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 STAT. 449 (1935). The
Wagner Act only protected the rights of employees to organize and strike.
The reason for such little federal-state collision in the field of labor relations
was a general absence of state law protecting the employee's rights. Isaacson,Federal Pre-Emption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB. RFL.. REV.
391-92 (1958).
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the courts with the problem of re-establishing them over this greater
area. Congress helped in this problem when considering the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act. It was aware of the pre-emption
doctrine which the Court had applied under the Wagner Act.9 The
Supreme Court took notice of this fact when it stated that Congress
"knew full well that its labor legislation 'preempts the field that
the act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act
is concerned .... ' " 10
Pre-eniption Under the Wagner Act
Since Congress knew of the rulings under the Wagner Act, it
can be assumed that by implication they were approved and incor-
porated in the Taft-Hartley Act. The Court had laid down three
general boundaries for the guidance of the lower courts. In Allen-
Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd.," the Court decided that
where Congress had generally pre-empted a field it did not preclude
a state from exercising its traditional police power over public safety
where violence was involved.12 The second area concerned the right
of a state to prohibit an act that Congress has specifically authorized.
In Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson,'3 a Florida court enjoined a labor
union from functioning until it complied with a state law providing
that a union that does not register and pay a license fee could not
function within the state. Since the freedom of the workers to bar-
gain collectively through their union was impaired by the state's ac-
tion, such action violated the Wagner Act.14  The third postulate
provided that a state could not act where the federal government
refused to act. In Bethlehem Steel Co, v. New York Lab. Rel. Bd.,1'
the state board recognized a collective bargaining agent although the
National Labor Relations Board refused to do so. In disallowing the
0 See UAW v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 273 n.10 (1956):
Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1951).
,Congress specially provided for state participation in labor relations on occa-
sions when the Board should cede jurisdiction. Labor Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(a), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1952).
10 Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., supra note 9, at 397-98.
"I315 U.S. 740 (1942).
12 The acts of violence were, inter alia, threats of bodily harm, obstruction
-of entrances and exits and threats of property damage. Allen-Bradley Local
v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942). See UAW v. Wisconsin
Emp. Rel. Bd., supra note 9, at 268-69. Cf. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co.
v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., J36 U.S. 301 (1949); International Union, UAW
v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elev.
,Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
13325 U.S. 538 (1945).
14 Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Accord, Bus Em-
-ployees v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951) ; International Union,
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
Is 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
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concurrent jurisdiction on the ground that the federal action was ex-
clusive, the Court recognized that federal power had not been dor-
mant, but rather the NLRB's refusal to act was a determination
within its discretionary power.' 6
Since the Taft-Hartley Act-The Garner Case
Since 1950 the Supreme Court has endeavored to clarify the
line of demarcation between state and federal power over the wider
area encompassed by the Taft-Hartley Act. Before the Court for-
mulated a rule to be followed there was conflict, and many state courts
assumed jurisdiction over disputes which they felt were not covered
by federal law.1 7 However, the Court has now decisively stated that
power over some conduct under the act is exclusively reserved to
the federal agency, and state action is foreclosed. Foreclosure was
first enunciated in Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel.
Bd.18 The Court held that a state labor relations statute, of the same
tenor as the Taft-Hartley Act, could not be invoked against an em-
ployer who usually came under the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Sub-
sequently, this principle of jurisdiction over employers' unfair labor
pracfices was applied to the unfair labor practices of a union in Garner
v. Teamsters Union.19 In this case the petitioner, engaged in inter-
state commerce, sought a state injunction to prevent the union from
continuing the peaceful picketing of his business. There was no
labor dispute and his employees were free to join the union, although
few wished to do so. It was found that the primary reason for the
picketing was to coerce the petitioner 20 into influencing his employees
to join the union. This was 'a violation of state law 21 and also con-
stituted an unfair labor practice under federal law.22 The Court con-
cluded that a state court may not adjudge the same controversy and
16 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Lab. Rel. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
Accord, Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
17 Van de Water & Petrowitz, JTaisdiction in Industrial Relations Cases,
31 So. CAL. L. Rav. 111, 124 n.71 (1958).
18338 U.S. 953 (1950), affirming per curiam 255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W.2d 688
(1949).
19346 U.S. 485 (1953).
20 When the peaceful pickets were placed in front of petitioner's entrance,
drivers and other carriers refused to cross the line. Business fell off 95%.
Id. at 487.
21 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6 (1952).
22 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a) (3) . . . ." Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b), 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1952). Subsection (a) (3) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an
employer, by discrimination in hiring or tenure, to encourage membership in
any labor organization.
[ VOL. 33
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extend its own relief 23 where the situation is covered by the federal
law, since such action would be disruptive of the uniformity which
Congress considered necessary. 24  "The conflict lies in remedies, not
rights .... But when two separate remedies are brought to bear on
the same activity, a conflict is imminent." 25 The Court concluded:
[W]hen federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protection of public
or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot
be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure merely because it
will apply some doctrine of private right.2 6
The Supreme Court's Application of the Garner Rule
In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnurn Constr. Corp.,2 7 de-
cided at the same term as the Garner decision, the Court pointed
up one of the areas under the Taft-Hartley Act that "leaves
much to the states," 28 although Congress withdrew from the states
much that had previously rested with them.29 The union's agent de-
manded that the construction corporation's employees join the union,
and that it be recognized as the sole bargaining agent. When these
23 The Board has the power, upon the filing of a complaint, to petition the
district court for an injunction to stop an unfair labor practice. Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(j), 61 STAT. 149 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1952).
24For the need of uniformity see, e.g., International Union, UAW v.
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (dissenting opinion) ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
25Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 498-99 (1953). (Emphasis
added.) In a recent New York case, Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico,
5 N.Y.2d 40, 152 N.E.2d 505, 177 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1958), the Court of Appeals
held that there was state jurisdiction when defendant's union picketed for the
purpose of compelling the employer to recognize that union instead of the
one duly certified by the NLRB. The Gariter case was distinguished on the
grounds that in the present case ". . . the complaint alleges that the defendants
demand that plaintiff recognize the defendant union . . . . [and] to do so
would not necessarily entail coercion by the plaintiff upon its employees ... "
Id. at 47, 152 N.E.2d at 508, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 477. It was further stated that
the picketing did not constitute an unfair labor practice since there was no
strike. Three judges dissented. The separate dissenting opinion of Judge
Fuld pointed out there was an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the
Taft-Hartley Act, even though there was no strike. Labor Management Re-
lations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4) (A), 61 STAT. 141-42 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952), provides that it is an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization to ". . . induce or encourage the employees . .. to
engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
... [for the purpose of] forcing or requiring any employer ... [to] cease
doing business with any . . . person. . . ." Judge Fuld's interpretation of
§ 158(b) (4) (A) had previously been given in International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701-02 (1951) ; NLRB v. Associated Musi-
cians, 226 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1955).
26 Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note 25, at 500-01.
27 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
28 Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note 25, at 488.
29 Ibid.
1958]
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demands were refused threats and intimidation followed 0 until the
corporation had to abandon the project it had undertaken. The cor-
poration sued in the state court for damages due to these practices.
The issue before the Court was whether federal pre-emption pre-
cluded state jurisdiction over common-law tort when the act com-
plained of was also an unfair labor practice. This question was
resolved in favor of the corporation, the Court deciding that the state
could take jurisdiction since there was no remedy 31 that conflicted
with or paralleled a federal remedy.3 2 However, the dissent indicatedi
that even when violence occurred the state court only had authority
to apply remedies which had no counterpart under the Taft-Hartley
Act, since "for each wrong which the federal Act recognizes the
parties have only the remedy supplied by that Act. . .. ,, 3
This seeming conflict with the Garner case may be explained by
later cases which declare it to be only a re-affirmation of the right of
the state to control violence by the exercise of its police power.
84
In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,3 5 which also followed the
Garner case, there was a jurisdictional dispute between two unions.
The day after a strike was called the corporation filed an unfair labor
charge. The NLRB found that no dispute existed within the mean-
30 The Virginia court found as a fact that the union's activities constituted
tortious misconduct consisting of violence and actions which put the employees
in fear of their lives and safety. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 660 n.4 (1954). Compare these violations with
those involved in the cases cited in note 12, supra.
31 Laburnum sustained the state's jurisdiction on the theory that "... there
was no compensatory relief under the federal Act and no federal administra-
tive relief with which the state remedy conflicts." Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 477 (1955).
32 "[Tlhe exercise by the State of its police power, which would be valid
if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where -the repugnance
or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or
consistently stand together.'" Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S.
1, 10 (1937). See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (dis-
senting opinion).
33 United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., supra note 30, at
671 (dissenting opinion).
34 The Laburnum case emphasized "... where the violent conduct was
reached by a remedy having no parallel .... " Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955). "Laburumo sustained an award of damages
under state tort law for violent conduct." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957). After the Laburnurn opinion, the Ninth Cir-cuit in a per curiam opinion denied a rehearing by limiting the Laburum rule
to situations where there were threats of violence and which were therefore
within the police power. Born v. Laube, 214 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1954) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 (1954). See also Morse v. Local 1058
Carpenters, 78 Idaho 405, 304 P.2d 1097 (1956); Tallman Co. v. Latal, 365
Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547 (1955). But in the following cases state jurisdiction
was upheld even where there was no violence. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955) ; Benjamin v. Foidl, 379
Pa. 540, 109 A.2d 300 (1954).
35348 U.S. 468 (1955).
[ VOL. 33
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ing of the pertinent section of the Taft-Hartley Act. But before the
Board made this finding, the corporation petitioned the Missouri state
court to enjoin the strike as a violation of the state's restraint of trade
statute. The state court granted the relief prayed for by the peti-
tioner. The Supreme Court held that because the Board only ruled
on one section of the Act did not mean that other sections had not
been violated and any such further action was vested exclusively in
the NLRB. It is plain from the language in this case that federal
pre-emption will not be made to turn upon the grounds for invoking
state action, but upon the question of dual remedy.
[W]here the moving party itself alleged unfair labor practices, where the facts
reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices,
and where the conduct, if not prohibited by federal Act, may be reasonably
deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must
decline jurisdiction . . . in the first instance.36
In Gus v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd.,3 7 the Court re-emphasized the
pre-emption doctrine in a labor case where, due to NLRB inaction,
a state court granted relief frol an unfair labor practice within the
meaning of the Taft-Hartley Act,38 The state remedy was set aside
on the ground that Congress had created an agency with exclusive
jurisdiction and the power to cede it, which power, however, is "the
exclusive means whereby States may be enabled to act concerning the
matters which Congress has entrusted to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board." 39
It would seem that the cases under the Taft-Hartley Act previ-
ously discussed turned on the question whether there was a duplica-
tion of remedy. If a federal remedy exists then state action is
precluded. 40  However, in two recent cases, International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales 41 and International Union, UA W v. Russell,42
3 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 34, at 481. But see Pleasant
Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 N.Y.2d 40, 152 N.E.2d 505, 177 N.Y.S.2d
473 (1958), in which the majority declared: "We are of the mind that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of jurisdiction, leaving it to the Supreme
Court to finally resolve the matter." Id. at 47, 152 N.E.2d at 508, 177 N.Y.S.2d
at 478.
37353 U.S. 1 (1957).
38 Budget limitations and administrative considerations have precluded the
NLRB from exercising its jurisdiction over all cases in which interstate com-
merce was present. Congress has recognized this practice. Guss v. Utah Lab.
Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (dissenting opinion). See Note, Discretionary
Administrative Jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 62
YALE L.J. 116 (1952).
39 Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., supra note 38, at 9.
40 "[F] or each wrong which the federal Act recognizes the parties have
only the remedy supplied by that Act .... If the parties not only have the
remedy Congress provided but the right to sue for damages as well, the con-
troversy is not settled . . ." United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 671 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
41356 U.S. 617 (1958).
42356 U.S. 634 (1958).
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the issue before the Court was whether a partial federal remedy pre-
cluded the comprehensive state remedy from being interposed without
a conflict.
The Gonzales Case
The petitioner brought an action in a state court for restoration
of his membership in the union 43 after an allegedly wrongful expul-
sion, and to recover damages for loss of wages as well as physical and
mental suffering. A state law provided for mandatory reinstatement
and damages for wrongful expulsion. The Taft-Hartley Act pro-
vided for reimbursement for back pay.44 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that although there was an unfair labor practice within the
provisions of the act, state action was not precluded, since the NLRB
could not grant the complete relief that the state court was empowered
to grant. To deprive a party of state remedies for all damages in-
curred, leaving only the possibility of partial federal relief, would be
a mutilation of the "comprehensive relief of equity." The Court fur-
ther reasoned that the conflict with federal policy was remote because:
(1) the subject matter was breach of contract and the suit did not
purport to remedy union conduct; 45 and (2) the same degree of
conflict is present in the restoration of membership as in the award
of damages. In either case the conflict was too remote, too contin-
gently related to the public interest to justify depriving state courts
of jurisdiction.46
In the dissenting opinion the Chief Justice applied the rule of
the Garner case by pointing out that allowing a state remedy to be
43 Although the question of reinstatement was not before the Court, it in-
dicated that a state court had jurisdiction to reinstate a wrongfully discharged
union member. This is in accord with the weight of authority. See, e.g., Real
v. Curran, 285 App. Div. 552, 138 N.Y.S.2d 809 (lst Dep't 1955); Thorman v.
International Alliance, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958) ; Mahoney v. Sailors'
Union, 45 Wash. 2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954).
44 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 61 STAT.
147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
45 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958).
"[T]he presence or absence of pre-emption is a consequence of the effect of
state action on the aims of federal legislation, not a game that is played with
labels or an exercise in artful pleadings." Id. at 632 (dissenting opinion).
"[F]ederal power cannot be curtailed by states even though the grounds of
intervention be different than that on which federal supremacy has been
exercised." Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
46 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, sipra note 45, at 619. The
Board has no power to order the restoration of union membership rights so
there cannot be any conflict. On the other hand, it does have power to award
back pay which does create a conflict. Id. at 632 (dissenting opinion). The
important distinction between the purposes of federal and state regulations has
been described as follows: "Although even these state court decisions may
lead to possible conflict between the federal labor board and state courts they
do not present potentialities of conflicts in kind or degree which requires a
hands off directive to the states." Isaacson, Labor Relations Lawa: Federal
Versus State urisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415. 483 (1956).
[ VOL. 33
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applied to a situation within the purview of the act permits a dupli-
cation of remedy, making conflict unavoidable. 47 One of the avowed
purposes of the act was to "protect the rights of the individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities
affect commerce .... ,, 48 The facts of the case at bar fell within this
purpose and when "Congress was prescribing a complete code of
regulations it did not contemplate actions in the state court for the
same conduct." -9 Congress vested exclusive power in the agency it
provided to carry out its will. The minority further believed that
duplication of relief and award of damages for which Congress did
not provide would deter employees from resorting to the federal ma-
chinery and thereby "frustrate the remedial pattern of the Federal
Act." 50
Before the Gonzales decision most of the lower courts had con-
cluded that since there was a federal remedy, state action was pre-
cluded.r' Born v. Laube,5 2 the leading case in this area, concerned a
petition for reinstatement, loss of wages and exemplary damages. The
court found that an unfair labor practice was involved and decided
that the federal remedy was exclusive. "[I]t is evident that since
the Act provides a procedure for redress and a corresponding remedy,
both the procedure and the remedy are exclusive in the absence of an
express provision or Board delegation to the contrary." 53
The other view can best be stated by a California case,5 4 which
allowed the petitioner to recover damages when a union picketed his
business in order to pressure him into coercing his employees to join
the union. The court concluded such conduct was tortious within the
meaning of the rule of the Laburnum case. The holding was based
on the belief that the union's activities were in violation of the de-
clared policy of the state, thereby giving the state court jurisdiction
despite the fact that the business enterprise was engaged in interstate
commerce.
55
47 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra note 45, at 623 (dis-
senting opinion).
48 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1(b), 61 STAT.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1952).
49 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra note 45, at 629 (dis-
senting opinion).
50 Id. at 632 (dissenting opinion).
51 See Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Schatte v. International
Alliance, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950); Real v. Curran, 285 App. Div. 552,
138 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1st Dep't 1955) ; Morse v. Local 1058, Carpenters, 78 Idaho
405, 304 P.2d 1097 (1956); Sterling v. Local 438, Liberty Ass'n of Steam
Fitters, 207 Md. 132, 113 A.2d 389 (1955); Mahoney v. Sailors' Union, 45
Wash. 2d 407, 275 P.2d 440 (1954).
52 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1954).
53 Id. at 410.
54 Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d
473 (1958).
"5 Ibid. See Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers Union, 49 Cal. 2d
625, 320 P.2d 492 (1958) ; Selles v. Local 174, Teamsters Union, 50 Wash. 2d
1958]
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The Russell Case
The second pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the matter
of pre-emption and parallel state remedy came in the Russell " case.
The striking union maintained a picket line around the factory where
petitioner worked. The pickets prevented the hourly wage earners
from reaching the plant by threats of bodily harm and damage to
their property. The state court awarded damages for loss of wages
and mental anguish plus punitive damages. The Supreme Court
affirmed, even though there was a federal remedy for this unfair labor
practice. 57 The majority reasoned that the fact that back pay, which
is only a partial remedy, can be awarded under the Taft-Hartley Act,
was not sufficient to distinguish this case from the Laburnum case.
They further insisted that since any federal award was discretionary
with the Board if it effectuated the policies of the act, this remedy
was merely incidental to Congress' primary purpose.
The majority believed there was no possibility of conflict since
federal pre-emption is applicable' only in two areas: (1) where one
forum would enjoin conduct as illegal which another forum might
find legal; and (2) where state courts would restrict the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the act.58 The Court allowed the award of
punitive damages as within the jurisdiction of the state court on the
ground that all damages caused by a union's tortious conduct can be
awarded since there was no clear declaration of a congressional pol-
icy for pre-emption.
The minority, as in the Gonzales case, believed that since there
was a federal remedy any state action would be a duplication and
cause conflict. But here the minority went even further, stating that
even if there were no federal remedy the state still could not act since
a gap in the scheme created by Congress does not give the state power
to correct the omission. 59 The dissent further advanced the theory
that adding additional remedies would upset the remedial scheme as
effectively as "frustrating or duplicating existing ones." 60
660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957) ; Kuzma v. Millinery Workers Union, 27 N.J. Super.
579, 99 A.2d 833 (1953) (dictum). The majority in the Selles case rested
its opinion on the facts that the NLRB may award back pay in its discretion.
and that the case involved a private right. The distinction between private and
public rights was rejected in the Garner case. Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
56 International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
57 The remedy is that of a back pay award. Labor Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1952).58 International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644 (1958).
59 d. at 650 (dissenting opinion). See Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., J53
U.S. 1 (1957).
60 International Union, UAW v. Russell, suPra note 58, at 650 (dissenting
opinion).
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The main point of the dissenting opinion is the impact that the
decision would have on the purpose and objects of the act-uniformity.
The approval of the use of punitive damages, which have been out-
lawed in some states, 61 can not lead to uniformity. Also militating
against uniformity is the fact that the courts of different states have
diverse attitudes towards labor organizations, which will inevitably
be given voice in the verdicts.0 2 In the minority's opinion, that which
Congress intended to promote-industrial peace-would be prevented
by the Court's decision. Labor disputes were intended to come to a
speedy conclusion, not to drag on and on in the courts, ". . . keeping
old wounds open, and robbing the administrative remedy of the heal-
ing effects, it was intended to have." 63 A plaintiff was unlikely to
seek a quick termination of the unfair labor practice "if he is
assured compensatory damages and has the prospect of a lucrative
punitive recovery as well." 04 In the Russell case the petitioner was
one of thirty employees who filed suit, the total damages claimed being
1,500,000 dollars.65
Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in the Garner and Laburnum cases, had
shed some light on the shadow area along the boundary of state-
federal jurisdiction. Both the Gonzales and Russell cases have con-
tinued the process of clearing up this area. The Court, in these cases,
felt that a congressional remedy was not exclusive and a state remedy
could be interposed without causing a conflict. This conclusion was
reached because the federal remedy was not adequate to grant the
comprehensive relief that the state court could grant. "[A]n em-
ployee's right to recover, in the state courts, all damages caused him
by . . . [the wrongful action of the defendant] can not fairly be said
61 Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington reject the doctrine
completely while Indiana and Connecticut apply it to a limited extent.
MCCORmICK, DAMAGES 279 (1935).
02 International Union, UAW v. Russell, supra note 58, at 651 (dissenting
opinion). "[T]he basic issue in the Russell case . . . is . . . if the state
courts, many of which are generally hostile to labor unions . . .are permitted
to award punitive damages, they will be given what is tantamount to an un-
challengeable right to deplete union treasuries and to inflict what may well be
a mortal blow upon the particular union activity. To vest the state courts
with such powers is to make the exercise of concerted activities so fraught
with peril that unions will choose to forego strike activities rather than risk
an adverse money judgment." Isaacson, Federal Pre-Emption Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB. REa.. Rxv. 391, 398 (1958).
6 3 United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 671(1954). In the Russell case nearly six years had elapsed from the time of ser-
vice until the decision. International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634,
654 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
64 International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 653-54 (dissenting
opinion). (Emphasis added.)
65 1d. at 656-58 (dissenting opinion).
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to be pre-empted without a clearer determination of congressional
policy than we find here." 66 The Supreme Court's statement of five
years ago still seems relevant: "The ... Act ... leaves much to the
states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We
must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the
area in which state action is still permissible." 67
V
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE OF CLAIM.S IN NEW YORK
The field of modification and discharge of claims in New York
is today unsettled I despite the fact that the common-law doctrines
have been largely superseded by statutes. 2 This note will point out
the common-law doctrines, the statutory changes, and the areas in
which the common law has been left untouched. The subjects herein
considered include modification, release, and accord and satisfaction.
Rescission
A contract may be terminated by rescission. If the parties to
an existing contract, either orally or by a writing mutually agree to
terminate their duties under it, they have rescinded it.3 Neither party
is then under any duty to perform his part of the contract.4 Each
promise, in the case of a bilateral contract, provides the necessary con-
sideration.5 Termination may be effected even if the parties immedi-
ately enter into a new contract on almost identical terms.6 Today the
66 Id. at 646.
617 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
1 See, e.g., Yonkers Fur Dressing Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 435,
160 N.E. 778 (1928); Langlois v. Langlois, 5 A.D.2d 75, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170
(3d Dep't 1957); Pape v. Rudolph Bros., Inc., 257 App. Div. 1032, 13 N.Y.S.2d
781 (4th Dep't 1939) (per curiam), aff'd mern., 282 N.Y. 692, 26 N.E.2d 817
(1940); Armour & Co. v. Schlacter, 159 N.Y.S.2d 135 (County Ct. 1957).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CR . LAw § 243; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 33(2),
33-a, 33-b, 33-c.
35 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1236 '(1951).
4bid.
5 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 406, comment a (1932). The term "aban-
donment" has been used interchangeably with rescission, and the effects are
the same. See Rodgers v. Rodgers, 235 N.Y. 408, 139 N.E. 557 (1923).
6 Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
As between a modification of a contract and an abandonment of it "very little
difference* may appear. . . . There is . . . a marked difference in principle.
Where the new contract gives any new privilege or advantage to the promisee,
a consideration has been recognized, though in the main it is the same contract."
Id. at 203, 131 N.E. at 889.
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